We investigate whether the equity-linked components of top executive pay have an effect on patenting activity within a firm. We find a positive relationship between firm patenting activity and managerial alignment incentives created by stock and stock option grants. Prior work has shown that the market value of a firm reflects the value of its patents. Thus, our finding suggests innovation is one such channel through which equity alignment incentives positively impact firm value. On the other hand, we find that the risk-taking incentive from stock options does not increase patenting.
Introduction
The recent economic crisis may have presented strategic incentives for managers to innovate. Under more normal circumstances however, we expect managerial contracts should play this role. Executive compensation packages are structured to align managerial actions with firm performance. The existing literature remains mixed on whether compensation contracts effectively induce managers to work in the best interest of the shareholders. In this paper, we investigate whether the compensation contracts of a firm's top executives create incentives to innovate within the firm.
In the 1990s, top executive pay in the US dramatically shifted towards stock and stock option grants (Hall and Liebman 1998) . At the same time, productivity growth and the stock market surged. Firm innovation has been shown to positively impact both the real (productivity) and financial (market value) performance of a firm. 1 It is therefore of interest to examine whether the incentives to innovate are driven, in part, by managerial pay.
Using patent counts as a measure of innovation, we find a positive relationship between equity alignment incentives and the extent of patenting activity within a firm. Patenting increases as managerial wealth from stock and stock options becomes more sensitive to changes in the firm's share price. Thus, equity alignment incentives increase innovative activity within a firm.
Assuming innovative strategies are inherently riskier than traditional capital expenditures, stock option grants have often been used to compensate risk-averse managers for taking on these types of risks. We find that this risk-taking incentive (measured by the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility or volatility sensitivity) does not increase patenting.
One interpretation of these results is that equity alignment incentives are more likely to induce managers to invest in safer R&D projects that result in patents. On the other hand, although the risk-taking incentive may very well induce managers to pursue riskier R&D projects that can potentially increase firm value, these riskier projects do not result in increased patenting activity.
At a time when executive pay is heavily concentrated in stock and stock options, our results underscore the importance of careful structuring of managerial compensation contracts, especially if one corporate objective is to build innovative firms. 2 Our findings warrant further investigation into these issues in order to determine the compensation contracts ideally suited for such firms.
Data and methodology

Sample selection
We obtain patent data from the updated version of the NBER's 'Patent Citations Database.' This data contains comprehensive information on all patents granted to US
